Selecting cryptographic key sizes is a valuable reference for estimating the security margin for algorithms and key sizes and is deliciously applicable to TLS configuration choices.
A few tasty tidbits:
Does anyone seriously believe that published attacks represent the state of the art? It may safely be assumed that unpublished work is many years ahead of what the public at large gets to see: a public announcement that a system is broken provides at best a rather trivial upper bound – and a very simple-minded one, in our opinion – for the date that the system became vulnerable.
According to Table 1, 512-bit RSA keys should not have been used beyond 1986.
According to Table 1 usage of 768-bit RSA keys can no longer be recommended. Even in the cost-equivalent model 768-bit RSA keys will soon no longer offer security comparable to the security of the DES in 1982.
Enter the 36 chambers of infrastructure wu-tang
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